KNOWING YOUR ENEMY

Knowing your enemy is a basic tenet of war and essential to achieving victory. But in attempting to comprehend the threat of terrorism, many in this country are laboring under serious misconceptions. According to Navin Bapat, assistant professor of political science, there are two major fallacies about terrorists that most Americans believe: one is that terrorists are deranged, all come from poor backgrounds, and are socially disaffected when in fact many of the terrorists are well educated, trained in the United States and Europe, and are usually well adjusted. The second fallacy is the motivation behind the act.

"It's a huge mistake to think that terrorists hate us because we're free or rich," says Bapat. "There is always a reason, motivation such as territory, economic circumstances, or government repression. And before we take any action, it's essential to learn what has made them hate us."

His views are echoed by Kevin Murphy, professor of psychology, who recently put together a team of psychologists, political scientists, religious scholars, sociologists, and historians for a proposed multidisciplinary center in response to a 2004 call for research proposals for the Department of Homeland Security. Murphy says when trying to find out why people engage in terrorism, we cannot begin with an agenda that assumes we know.

"What's broadly believed in Washington is that terrorists are psychotic, stupid, or poor," he says. "None of these are even close to being right. In fact, many of these people—especially the leaders - are very charismatic. We should be looking at real variables that encourage people to become terrorists to achieve their goals. And those reasons are not easily summed up."

In Bapat's undergraduate seminar on terrorism, he explores the question of why people grow to hate each other. When certain people are associated with frightening acts, it creates fear and animosity in others. When this happens, the people who are personifying fear to the larger populace become defensive and eventually think, if I'm viewed as a killer, I have to protect myself. Bapat calls this a security dilemma.

"Both of these sides are distrustful and fearful of each other," he explains.

"Eventually, this creates an 'ingroup' whereby a person begins to define himself by exclusion by the 'outgroup'. And the more powerless the ingroup feels, the more hostile towards the outgroup they become."

However, if there is a third party to adjudicate these disputes— such as police or a judicial system—a peaceful solution may be reached. But if this third party does not exist, or is biased or corrupt, the group may feel that it has to resort to violence because there's no other recourse.

"What we've found that there are two things all these groups have in common," says Murphy. "One of those is a passionate commitment to a cause. The other is that violence is a desperation tactic which has been arrived at after they've run the gamut of other, nonviolence tactics which has not been effective."

Murphy's point also illustrates why the nonviolent methods used by Gandhi and Martin Luther King are even more impressive than we already acknowledge. Bapat concurs, saying that a successful nonviolent campaign can signal more strength than a violent one. If efforts to repress the nonviolent campaign fail, the group gains even more followers and strength. So why don't more insurgent groups use nonviolence as a tactic?

"Because it's very dangerous," says Bapat. "Think of what happened at Tiananmen Square. Remember that it's always a strategic game: If I think the government is going to come down hard on my group, it's not in my interest to put my members at risk. If I feel that I don't have to arm my group, it sends a much stronger and more confident message."

Another interesting aspect to understanding the mind of the terrorist is understanding the mind of the person who is calling him a terrorist. To Americans, the events of September 11, 2001, was unequivocally carried out by terrorists. But to those who shared Al-Qaida's view of the world, the people who flew the airplanes into the World Trade Towers were heroes, advancing their very real grievance against the United States. But what about groups such as the African National Congress, the young Freedom Riders during the early days of the Civil Rights movement, or the Sons of Liberty, a "secret" organization formed by Samuel Adams around 1765 who carried out the Boston Tea Party and grew to create the Continental Army eventually led to the Revolutionary War? Are these terrorist or patriot groups?

""In Afghanistan, the same group, the Mujhahadeen, who Reagan called 'freedom fighters,'—against the Soviets—quickly found another cause when Iraq invaded Kuwait: removing the American infidels from the Holy Land," Bapat points out. "Osama Bin Laden, who considered himself a friend to the Saudis, asked if he could participate in expelling Iraq from Kuwait. He was turned down in favor of the Americans. It became his rallying cry and best recruitment tool."

This shift in perception is all about psychology, says Kevin Murphy. Although Americans believe that Bin Laden's followers have been manipulated to perceive certain threats, many would argue that Americans are manipulated in similar ways.

"There seems to be two schools of thought on the topic of risk," says Kevin Murphy. "One is that we never took the threat seriously enough in the past; the other is that the response is overblown in a way that is dysfunctional and threatens civil liberties. But in any case, terrorism is most effective when people's response is disproportionate to the real risk."

Both professors feel that a multidisciplinary approach to the problem of terrorism must be implemented. Prevention is the ultimate solution, says Bapat, so it's vital to understand the many factors that create a terrorist group.

"Terrorism is inherently a social phenomena, depending on a wide range of factors," says Murphy. "In response, we must use a variety of strategies from a variety of sources. We may never get to the point where we can predict where and when an attack might occur, but there's a tremendous amount we can do to make terrorist groups less effective and disrupt their processes."